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Faculty and Deans

Diminished Luster in Escambia County?
by Neal Devins

FACTS

Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan
(Docket No. 82-1295)
To be argued january 10, 1983
ISSUES

When President Reagan signed into law the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act, he proclaimed:
"the right to vote is the crown jewel of American liberties, and we will not see its luster diminished." The
possibility of such diminution was real, in part, because
the Supreme Court ruled in its 1980 City of Mobile v.
Bolden decision that both constitutional and statutory
vote dilution challenges required proof of intentional
racial discrimination. (446 U.S. 55 ( 1980)) In response to
this decision, Congress amended section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to prohibit any voting law or practice "imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color [or language minority states]."
Such Congressional action led many observers to believe
that statutory Voting Rights Act challenges to state and
local procedures would supplant constitutional Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Fifteenth Amendment challenges to such procedures. The
viability of Fourteenth Amendment voter dilution
claims will be addressed by the Supreme Court in Escambia County, Florida v. McMillan.
The Escambia County case is of great national significance for several reasons. First, it could determine
whether proof of intentional racial discrimination can be
made through reliance on result-oriented indicators.
Second, Escambia County calls into question the constitutionality of at-large elections in areas with concentrated
minority populations. Third, the case might involve a
determination as to the degree of deference which
should be accorded to district court fact finding on civil
rights matters. In addition to these issues, Escambia
County raises the issue of whether the Florida Constitution permits unchartered county governments to unilaterally restructure their election procedures.

Neal Devins is a research associate at the Institute for Public
Policy Studies, Vanderbilt University, 1208 Avenue South,
Nashville, TN 37212; telephone (615) 322-8540.
IssueNo.14

The present lawsuit involves an appeal by the county
to rulings that: 1) its at-large system of electing members
of the Board of County Commissioners is unconstitutional, and 2) the Board of Commissioners lacks authority to modify its previous election method without voter
approval of such modifications. These rulings were
made by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals.
Escambia County voters elect their five member
Board of County Commissioners in accordance with an
at-large voting system. Under this system, candidates
run for numbered places corresponding to the districts
in which they live, but each must be elected by voters of
the entire county. Although blacks comprise seventeen
percent of the registered voters in Escambia County,
none of the four blacks who had run for the county
commission had been elected. In 1977, a class action suit
was initiated on behalf of black citizens of Escambia
County, who claimed that the county's at-large election
scheme improperly diluted their votes and thus was
infirm under several federal civil rights statutes and
various constitutional provisions.
(Note: Also at issue in the 1977 litigation was the
propriety of the method of election for the Pensacola
City Council and the Pensacola School Board. In both
situations, the district court concluded that the method
of election was unconstitutional and the court of appeals
affirmed that ruling. In regard to the school board, the
district concluded that a 194 7 Florida statute mandating
an at-large system for electing board members was
borne from a desire to exclude blacks. Prior to 1945,
school board members were elected in single-member
district elections. Candidates in these elections were selected through all-white primaries. In 1945, that election
scheme was declared unconstitutional. In the next legislative session, Florida switched to at-large school board
elections. The Escambia County district concluded that
this change purposefully sought to dilute black voting
strength through the use of an at-large system. More
complex than the school board issue was the Escambia
County district court's invalidation of the method of
election for the Pensacola City Council. Prior to 1959,
the city council consisted of ten members: five were
elected from single-member wards and five were elected
at-large but with a ward residency requirement. In 1959,
an exclusively at-large method of election was adopted
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- apparently in response to the fact that, in 1955, a
black ran a very close race against a white for one of the
single-member seats. The Escambia County district
court concluded that the 1959 change was racially motivated and thus invalidated the at-large method of election.
Black voters contended that both the effect and the
purpose of Escambia County's at-large election scheme
was to prevent black candidates from attaining a majority of the voters in the county commission elections. In
support of their contention, black plaintiffs demonstrated that there had been a consistent pattern of racially polarized voting. Other circumstantial evidence
was also introduced by black plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the at-large system had been maintained to prevent
the election of blacks: "The adverse effects of past discrimination by the state and county governments on
blacks' exercise of their suffrage rights and participation
in the political system, the depressed economic status of
blacks in the county, the tenuousness of the state policy
behind the at-large system, and the county commissioner's refusal to submit to voters a proposed referendum
that would change the election system from at-large to
single-member districts ... " Countering this evidence,
Escambia County officials stressed their general reprehensiveness to the needs of black citizens, their opinion
that at-large elections would make representative more
sensitive to county needs and black plaintiffs failure to
introduce any direct evidence which suggests that racial
discrimination was the basis of their interest in maintaining the at-large system.
In December of 1979, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida upheld plaintiffs claims
and ordered the Escambia County commissioners to
submit a proposal to rectify the constitutional defect.
The county commission submitted a mixed single-member/at-large election scheme which they had adopted by
ordinance. The voters of Escambia County rejected this
proposal in a referendum election, however. Yet, the
Escambia County commissioners contended that they
had authority to unilaterally pass the ordinance. The
district court disagreed and mandated single-member
district elections. Supreme Court cases addressing remedies for unconstitutional vote dilution have distinguished between judicially imposed and legislatively
adopted plans. While a judicial remedy must employsingle-member district, legislative plans may include
multi-member district and at-large election components.
In February, 1981, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court ruling. The appellate court concluded that the Supreme Court's 1980
Mobile v. Bolden decision disapproved of the sort of evidence utilized by the district court in concluding that the
at-large election scheme was maintained for racially discriminatory reasons. In September. 1982, the appellate
court reversed its 1981 decision in response to the Su252

preme Court's decision in Rogers v. Lodge. (102 S.Ct.
3272 (1982))
Rogers v. Lodge, as interpreted by the appellate court,
reflects a more favorable view of the circumstantial evidence which was the basis of the district court ruling.
Rogers also requires appellate courts to defer to district
courts' factual findings of intent because such findings
"represent ... a blend of history and an intensely local
appraisal of the design and impact of the [election
system at issue] in light of past and present reality,
political and otherwise." In light of Rogers, the appellate
court concluded that the district court's ruling was
within the bounds of its authority.
The appellate court also concluded that the county
commission was prohibited from unilaterally restricting
its election system under the Florida Constitution. The
crux of this holding was that Escambia County Commission was a noncharter government and, under the state
constitution, its legislative powers encompassed only
those areas specifically provided by state laws. State law
would have permitted the Escambia County voters to
enact a reappointment scheme. Yet, the appellate court
felt that state law did not specifically provide such power
to the county commission. Consequently, the appellate
court affirmed the district court single-member district
remedy since the county commission was without power
to implement its self-initiated remedial plan - a plan
which would have combined components of at-large and
single-member district election schemes.
Defendant Escambia County Commission appealed
the appellate court ruling to the Supreme Court. Two
issues predominate their appeal, namely: l) whether the
appellate court was too deferential in its review of district court factfinding, and 2) whether the Florida Constitution permits the county commission to unilaterally
restructure its election system.
The thrust of the county commission's argument is
that the appellate court misunderstood the Supreme
Court's Rogers v. Lodge decision. First, the county commission contends that Rogers did not loosen the Mobile v.
Bolden criteria for a finding of purposeful discrimination. Instead, Rogers, according to the commission, was a
fact-specific decision involving a more substantial evidentiary demonstration by black plaintiffs. Second, the
commission argues that Rogers, because of plaintiffs
strong evidentiary record, does not suggest that appellate courts be especially deferential to district court findings of racially discriminatory intent. Third, the
commission contends that the Escambia County district
court ruling was clearly erroneous and thus should be
reversed. In support of this conclusion, the commission
suggests that the district court improperly relied on
insignificant circumstantial evidence. Contrasting this
view, black plaintiffs argue that the district court ruling
should be affirmed since the commissioner's good government justification for at-large elections was unbeliePREVIEW

vable. For black plaintiffs, the fact that each
commissioner has special ties to one of five single-districts negates the commissioner's proffered rationale of
each commissioner's serving as county - not district representatives.
In addition to their contention that the district
court's ruling on the issue of liability was clearly erroneous, the Escambia County Commission also argues
that the district court was in error on the issue of remedy. Rejecting the district court view that the commission was without authority to unilaterally adopt a
combined single-member/at-large voting scheme, the
commission argued that Florida law authorizes it to unilaterally respond to the courts' invalidation of at-large
elections. The commission contends that its authority
stems from a Florida constitutional provision that permits county commissions to enact ordinances .. not inconsistent with general or special law." Since Florida's
requirement that nonchartered county's (which do not
change their method of election through Home Rule
Act referendum) have at-large elections was invalidated
as it applied to Escambia County, the county commission
believes that it can now act unilaterally without violating
Florida law. Black plaintiffs contend that this argument
is spurious. In support of this contention, black plaintiffs refer to an opinion of the state attorney general
which concluded that a "[nonchartered] county is without authority under state law to enact a singJe-member
system or other alternatives to a purely at-large election
system for county commissioners."
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Escambia County lawsuit is of potentially great
significance to Escambia County, the state of Florida and
the nation. In Escambia County, a black candidate is
expected to become a county commissioner under the
district court ordered single-member district election
plan. In Florida, the state legislature- at the suggestion
of the state attorney general- is considering the enactment of legislation which could permit (or mandate)
nonchartered county governments to switch from atlarge to single-member district election schemes. The
Florida Attorney General made this recommendation
since several Florida nonchartered counties with
insubstantial minority representation will incur substantial legal costs as well as have their local elections held up
if area blacks challenge their at-large· election procedures.
On the national level, Escambia County raises two important issues, namely, 1) the narrow issue of whether
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is an effective tool in voter dilution challenges, and
2) the more general issue of what constitutes proof of
intentional racial discrimination. The common perception that Congress had to incorporate an .. effects" or
"results" oriented standard in the 1982 amendment of
lssueNo.l4

section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may- to some extent
- be limited by the Escambia County lawsuit. Excepting
proof that at-large elections had a racially disproportionate effect, black plaintiffs in Escambia County could
introduce very little in the way of hard or substantial
evidence that the county commission was maintaining
the at-large election system for racially discriminatory
reasons. At the same time, black plaintiffs were able to
introduce suggestive or circumstantial evidence which
called into question the county commission's proferred
""good government" rationale for at-large elections.
A Supreme Court ruling in favor of black plaintiffs
on constitutional grounds would indicate that Equal
Protection Clause voter dilution challenges will be
successful if plaintiffs introduce: 1) proof of disproportionate impact, plus 2) substantial- but not overwhelming - circumstantial evidence which hints at a racially
discriminatory purpose. Although section 2 of the Voting Rights Act might already mandate an identical result
on statutory grounds, the constitutional ruling is significant since it establishes a standard which can only be
modified by the Supreme Court, rather than the Congress.
A ruling in favor of black plaintiffs also suggests that
at-large election schemes with a racially disproportionate impact in communities with a history of purposeful
racial discrimination are per se unconstitutional. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the most significant piece of "suggestive" evidence introduced by black
plaintiffs concerned the history of intentional discrimination in Escambia County and the state of Florida. At
the same time, the Supreme Court could limit a holding
favorable to black plaintiffs in Escambia County by stressing the import of other bits of "suggestive,"
"circumstantial" evidence.
The most significant aspect of Escambia County might
be the Court's general ruling on what constitutes intentional racial discrimination since voting is only one context in which invidious racial discrimination might occur
and since the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments protect this right on statutory grounds. Escambia County
might prove most significant in areas subject to racial
discrimination which lack supplemental statutory protections. In the 1977 Arlington Heights decision, the Supreme Court set out several factors which indicate
discriminatory intent. (429 U.S. 252 (1977)) They are: 1)
the effect of the official action; 2) the historical background of the decision; 3) the sequence of events; 4)
substantive and procedural departures, and 5) legislative history. Proof of intentional discrimination in Escambia County relies primarily on the first two of these
five components. Consequently, a ruling in favor of
black plaintiffs would suggest that a district court judge
has substantial leeway to assess on a case by case basis the
contours of the Equal Protection Clause protections.
Again, the Supreme Court could seek to modi£\' the
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apparent breadth of such a holding by suggesting that
black plaintiffs made an especially strong factual showing in Escambia County.
ARGUMENTS
For Black Plaintiffs
l. The Escambia County Commission violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
retaining for race-motivated reasons an at-large election scheme with a racially disproportionate impact.
2. The district court property relied on substantial
circumstantial evidence and thus its finding of purposeful racial discrimination was not clearly erroneous.
3. The Escambia County Commission - as a nonchartered county government - lacked authority to unilaterally implement a combination at-large/singlemember election scheme.
4. The district court acted within its authority by ordering a single-member election scheme in Escambia
County.

For Escambia County
l. The Escambia County Commission maintained the
at-large election scheme for reasons of "good government''- not racial discrimination .
2. By failing to base its determination on "direct" evidence, the district court's finding of purposeful racial
discrimination was clearly erroneous.
3. The Escambia County Commission was authorized to
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unilaterally adopt a combination at-large/singlemember election scheme since its action was not inconsistent with effective Florida laws.
4. The district court transgressed the county commission's legislative authority by mandating the implementation of a single-member election scheme.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support of Black Plaintiffs
The Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
filed an amicus brief which contained an argument identical to that made by black plaintiffs.

In Support of Escambia County
The State Association of County Commissioners of
Florida and twenty-one nonchartered Florida counties
filed a joint amicus brief. In an effort to buttress the
arguments made by Escambia County, this amicus brief
stressed that: l) the district court failed to recognize the
fact specific nature of Rogers v . Lodge in its determination of purposeful discrimination, and 2) the countv
commission's authority to unilaterally adopt a combin~
tion at-large/single-member voting scheme was also supported by case law and legislati\'e comment not cited in
Escambia Countv's appellant brief. An amicus brief was
also filed by Orange County, Florida. This brief limited
itself to whether noncharter county go\'ernment's rna\·
unilaterally amend voting procedures.
.
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